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A New Reading of the Three Dialogues
in Mishnah Avodah Zarah*
Amit Gvaryahu
“Rabbi Benaya said: One should always
dwell deep in mishnayot. For if he knocks,
they will reveal to him – if [on the door of]
study, study; if [on the door of] Aggadah,
Aggadah.”1
Mishnah Avodah Zarah discusses and describes the laws pertaining to
relationships between Jews and the Gentile world that they inhabit. It is
also studded with narrative, dialogue and homily: approximately 20 per-
cent of the tractate belongs to at least one of these genres. The combina-
tion of legal and non-legal material in this tractate makes the tractate a
perfect starting point for any discussion of the complex relationships the
rabbis had with Others around them and the laws they shaped for deal-
ing with them and their world.
Within the tractate there are three dialogue-stories between rabbis
and Gentiles or between rabbis about Gentiles. These stories share var-
ious formal textual traits. First, they are dialogues. Second, they all
begin with the verb shaal, which in this context has the technical mean-
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1 Lev Rab. ed. Margulies, 481, according to MS London 340.
ing of “posing a halakhic inquiry.”2 That is, they are all etiological dia-
logues, as attested by the shared inquiry mipenei mah (“for what rea-
son?” “in light of which factor?”).3
Each of these dialogues has been read extensively on its own, as if
analyzing the dialogue in isolation was sufficient for understanding the
“rabbinic” approach to the problem posed therein.4 The problems in the
tractate that are worked out in the set of dialogues, however, are greater
than those within each single dialogue. A comprehensive approach that
attempts to pinpoint the function of the three dialogues as part of the
larger tractate will, I believe, lead us to a deeper understanding of the
tractate, or at least of some of the problems that it so artfully covers up.5
This paper is an attempt to understand the construction and redac-
tion of this tractate through the study of these dialogue-stories and their
context.6 It will demonstrate sensitivity to genre and aesthetics in explor-
ing questions of higher criticism. Additionally, I explicate the role of the
dialogues as a stylistic and rhetorical device in the shaping of tractate
Avodah Zarah. This will be a three-fold process. First, I read the dia-
logues as “stories.”7 Next, I examine them in light of the collections of
mishnayot into which they are embedded. Finally, I present a reevalua-
tion of the place of these dialogues in the overall textual structure of the
tractate.
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2 See e. g. t. Ber. 4:16, pace Saul Lieberman, Tosefta Zeraim (New York: Jewish
Theological Seminary, 1956) 22 line 64. See also t. San. 7:7 and Ishay Rosen-Zvi,
“The Protocol of the Study House in Yavneh? A New Look at Tosefta Sanhedrin
7” (Heb.), Tarbiz 78 (2009) 447–477, esp. ch. 3.
3 This question is quite rare in the Mishnah (it appears sixteen times in MS Kauf-
mann) and appears in stories only here. (My use of the designation “stories” follows
Moshe Simon-Shoshan, “Halacha Lemaaseh: Narrative and Legal Discourse in the
Mishnah” [PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2005].)
4 For literature, see notes on each dialogue below.
5 Two prerequisites for such a study – textual criticism and a philological study –
were filled by David Rosenthal, “Mishnah Avodah Zarah: A Critical Edition and
Introduction” (Heb.; PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1980) [hereafter:
Rosenthal, AZ].
6 In this respect, it is a departure from Moshe Simon-Shoshan, “Halachah,” 81–82,
who does not wish to “impinge” on the source-critical debate: “The claim that on a
literary-linguistic level, the Mishnah is composed of a diversity of genres and forms is
not contingent on the question of whether the Mishnah is made up of different strata
and diverse sources on the historical-philological level, or the extent to which these
strata and sources were integrated in the editorial process.” Indeed, it is not necessarily
contingent, but in this case it is.
7 Simon-Shoshans framework for regarding “narrative” as part of the warp and
woof of almost every mishnaic text, and differentiating between various “levels” of
narrativity in the text, is quite compelling. See esp. chs. 1 and 2 of his “Halachah.”
For a survey of those before him who introduced literary methods into the study of
rabbinic literature, see his introduction, idem.
David Rosenthal posited that what we know today as Mishnah Avo-
dah Zarah consists of two separate compositions: chapters 1–4 are “trac-
tate Avodah Zarah,” which we shall discuss in this paper. This tractate
has a typical homiletic ending at 4:8. Chapter 4:9 to the end of the trac-
tate is a separate composition, which could be termed “tractate Libated
Wine” (yeyn nesekh). The two tractates are distinct from one another in
various stylistic points, in the focus of the latter specifically on Gentile
wine as opposed to other food of the Gentiles, and in the names of the
sages in the latter half, which are later than those in the first half. The
second half also features more exempla than the first half.8 I find this
theory of two separate compositions quite convincing, and this premise,
though not without difficulties, is the basis of our current study.
A. Mishnah Avodah Zarah 2:5
The first dialogue in the tractate is a conversation between R. Ishmael
and R. Joshua on the subject of Gentile cheese.9
R. Judah said: R. Ishmael asked R. Joshua when they were on the road,
“Why did they forbid the cheese of Gentiles?”
He said: “Because they ferment it in the stomach of a carcass.”
He said: “But the [prohibition of the] stomach of the burnt-offering is
more severe than [that of] a stomach of a carcass,”
and they said: “A priest who is of sound mind slurps it raw,” and the
sages did not agree but said: “No benefit may be derived [from it], but it is
not a sacrilege (ein nehenin ve-ein mo<alin)?”
They said to him: “Because they ferment it in the stomach of calves
[dedicated to] idolatry.”
He said: “If so, why did they not forbid benefit derived from it?”
He led him to a different matter.
He said: “Brother Ishmael, how do you read: for your love is better than
wine (Song 1:2), in the masculine (dodekha) or in the feminine (dodayikh)?”
He said: “In the feminine.”
He said: “It is not so, for his companion [i. e., the next verse] testifies, to
the smell of your good oil (Song 1:3) [in the masculine, shemanekha].”10
R. Ishmael seems to be asking an innocent question: why did the rabbis
forbid the cheese of Gentiles? He receives no good answer. R. Joshua
tries to explain that Gentile cheese is forbidden because it is fermented
in the stomach of a carcass. However, the milk in the stomach of the
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8 Rosenthal, AZ, 1:261–263.
9 A full apparatus of Mishnah variants may be found in Rosenthal, AZ. Brackets
indicate notes by the author.
10 m. Avod. Zar. 2:5.
carcass may be consumed, according to rabbinic halakhah.11 This is
proved by R. Ishmael with an inference from a similar case, in which
the stomach of a burnt offering may be consumed: although the offering
is forbidden more severely than a carcass, a priest passing by the offering
burning on the altar may slurp fermented milk from its stomach.
R. Joshua then tries to argue that Gentile cheese is forbidden due to
the laws of idolatry, but R. Ishmael refutes this explanation by pointing
out that benefit derived from the cheese is permitted, unlike all other
derivatives of idolatry. R. Joshua gives up, and “leads” R. Ishmael to a
different matter.
Shlomo Naeh has suggested that this conversation is no innocent
exchange: R. Ishmael knows that there is no answer to his question;
he asks it simply to make a theological statement about forbidden Gen-
tile foods more generally.12 R. Joshua tries to use a formalistic frame-
work of specific prohibitions to explain the reasoning behind every for-
bidden Gentile item. In the end, however, formalism makes way for
theology – just as R. Ishmael planned. R. Ishmael forces R. Joshua to
agree that formalistic distinctions have no place in deciding which foods
are forbidden. Using the verse from the Song of Songs, and its allego-
rical interpretation, he reads “for your love is better than wine” to mean
“the love of God is better than wine”: the people of Israel love their God
more than Gentile foods, wine and oil, and therefore do not partake of
such Gentile foods. Though R. Joshua does not answer R. Ishmaels
specific question about cheese, he offers a rationale for all forbidden
Gentile foods as a unit. They were forbidden by the Jews, or the rabbis,
because Jews (or rabbis) love God more than wine or oil.13 This, Naeh
persuasively explains, is the precise meaning of “he led him to a different
matter” (hissio ledevar aher), R. Joshua is questioning the premise of the
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11 See also m. Hul. 8:5 y. Avod. Zar. 2:7, 41c and b. Avod. Zar. 35a-b, as well as
Christine E. Hayes, Between the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds: Accounting for
Halakhic Difference in Selected Sugyot from Tractate Avodah Zarah (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996) 32–35.
12 Naeh, “Love,” 428.
13 That Gentile foods are forbidden per se is a prevalent opinion in Second Temple
literature. See, most recently, David C. Kraemer, Jewish Eating and Identity through the
Ages (London: Routledge, 2007) 25–38. See also Christine Hayes, Gentile Impurities
and Jewish Identities: Intermarriage and Conversion from the Bible to the Talmud
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 108, 138–144. Hayes contends that foods
can either be prohibited due to Gentile impurity or due to the fact that the foods
themselves contain a prohibited substance. This dichotomy seems a bit problematic:
some foods (for example, the bread of the Gentiles or the oil of the Gentiles) can be
forbidden because they belong to Gentiles, not because they are impure – and Gentiles,
since they are impure, like those with genital influxes, can render food impure, but this
does not necessarily make the food forbidden.
question R. Ishmael is presenting: ask not, he says, why it is prohibited;
it is prohibited, as are all other Gentile foods.
The story in the Mishnah, however, is situated in the midst of a
sequence of mishnayot; an analysis of the exchange between R. Ishmael
and R. Judah in its proper literary context will further illuminate its
purpose within the tractate. The mishnayot into which this story is
placed are arranged in descending order of severity, from the most
severe prohibitions to the least severe ones:
1. These are items of Gentiles that are forbidden, and from which no
benefit may be derived: […]
Meat on its way into a temple of an idol is permitted;
and on the way out it is forbidden, for it is similar to the “offerings of the
dead” (Ps. 106:25) – the words of R. Akiva.
Those who are on their way to worship […].14
2a. Wine belonging to a Jew that is stored in wineskins of Gentiles or
their jugs is forbidden, and no benefit may be derived from it – the words
of R. Meir;
the sages say, benefit may be derived from it.
2b. Muries15 and cheese bithuniake16 of Gentiles are forbidden, and no
benefit may be derived from them – the words of R. Meir;
the sages say, benefit may be derived from them.
2c. Stones of grapes and grape skins of Gentiles are forbidden, and no
benefit may be derived from them – the words of R. Meir;
the sages say, benefit may be derived from them.
The story of R. Ishmael and R. Joshua
3. These are items of Gentiles that are forbidden, but benefit may be
derived from them: […]
4. These may be consumed: […]
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14 The matter of “those who are on their way to worship” (tarafut) is an interpola-
tion introduced here based on the stylistic similarity of that mishnah with the previous
one. In both, those who are “going in” have one status (meat is permitted, worshippers
forbidden), and on the “way out” the status is reversed (meat is forbidden, worshippers
are permitted).
15 Muries is a Latin loanword: “brine used for pickling” (Oxford Latin Dictionary,
ed. G.M. Lee, [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968], 1147). Cf. Greek halmyois (cf.
m. Shab. 14:2: hilme and Yerushalmi ad loc., which explains that this food can only be
made by a professional). See Samuel Krauss, Griechishe und Lateinische Lehnwörter im
Talmud, Midrasch und Targum (Berlin: S. Calvary, 1898–99) 329. See also Michael
Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic (2nd ed.; Ramat Gan and Balti-
more: Bar Ilan University Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) 296. For
the price of muries, see Daniel Sperber, Roman Palestine, 200–400: Money and Prices
(Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1991) 133–138.
16 “Cheese bithyniake” is not a kind of cheese. Bithyniake is merely a Greek gloss on
“cheese” that means “Bythinian.” Just as “Asakalônia” means “onions (from Asca-
lon),” so “bithyniakê” means “cheese (from Bythina).” See Rosenthal, AZ, 258–259.
It is also a gloss in t. Avod. Zar. 5:13 and t. Shevi. 5:9. In later sources, however, there
is a distinction between cheese and “cheese bythiniake”; see b. Avod. Zar. 34b.
There are four units in this collection. Unit 1 enumerates products from
which no benefit may be derived. These include wine and wine products,
as well as other by-products of idolatry (“hearted hides”). Unit 2 fea-
tures products similar to those in unit 1 according to the opinion of R.
Meir, but similar to those in unit 3 according to the sages. Unit 3 enu-
merates products that everyone agrees are forbidden but from which
benefit may be derived. Unit 4 lists products that are permitted even
for consumption. Without the dialogue, the division between units and
the gradual easement of prohibitions from unit 1 to unit 4 would be
obvious. The dialogue is inserted at the center point of the collection,
and it does not fit into the neat structure of descending severity upon
which the collection of mishnayot is based.
Following Naeh, I see this dialogue as ending on an emphatic note:
formalistic distinctions are no impediment to the love of God that is
manifest in the avoidance of Gentile food according to the laws in the
Mishnah.17 If so, the conclusion of the dialogue, which contends that all
Gentile foods are forbidden equally, is out of place in a collection ofmish-
nayot that posits that some Gentile foods are in fact forbidden more than
others.18 The prohibition of wine and oil, the two items cited by R. Joshua
in the verse to which he is referring, are not identical: benefit derived from
wine is forbidden, whereas benefit derived from oil is not.19 Themishnayot
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17 This is not to say of course that the author of the dialogue does not know of such
distinctions, as two of them come up in the course of the dialogue! The author, and R.
Joshua, know of such distinctions but undermine and virtually delegitimize them.
18 It is interesting, however, that R. Ishmael and R. Joshua both agree in their
argument that benefit derived from cheese is not forbidden. This means that R.
Joshuas homiletical answer, appealing as it is, does not actually even fit the facts of
the question.
19 On oil, see Rosenthal, AZ, 166–174; Zvi Aryeh Steinfeld, “Concerning the Pro-
hibition Against Gentile Oil” (Heb.), Tarbiz 49 (1980) 264–77; Martin Goodman,
“Kosher Olive Oil in Antiquity,” in A Tribute to Géza Vermès: Essays on Jewish and
Christian Literature and History, ed. P. R. Davies and R. T. White (New York: Conti-
nuum, 1990) 227–245; and recently, Jordan Rosenblum, “Kosher Olive Oil in Antiquity
Reconsidered,” JSJ 40 (2009) 356–365. Vermes sees the repeal of the decree on oil as
the work of a confused halakhist; Rosenblum believes it is an economic enactment.
Rosenblum calls the insertion of the emendation “Rabbi and his court allowed oil”
an “editorial insertion” (p. 359). This is a terminological blunder, unless he means
something like “copy-editor,” someone reading a manuscript and inserting a gloss
which is not part of the Mishnah at all. The gloss is attested in two different formulae;
various MSS use different names – within these two formulae – for the authority who
“allowed” the oil, and it is attested in different places within the Mishnah in various
MSS, a clear sign of a late interpolation into a work. Moreover, in many good witnesses
of the Mishnah there is no gloss (see Rosenthal, AZ, edition ad loc.). As Rosenthal has
shown (AZ, 166–174), the authority that permitted the oil is R. Judah Nesiah, Rabbis
grandson, who flourished around 260 or even 270. The interpolation was not known by
Rav and Samuel, meaning that it did not hark back to the circle of Rabbi.
distinguish, for example, between Gentile milk that has been milked un-
supervised and milk that was milked under supervision; between meat
going into the house of an idol and meat coming out; and between wine
and wine derivatives, from which benefit is forbidden, and all other pro-
ducts, which are simply not to be consumed. These distinctions make
sense only in the context of discreet prohibitions, such as forbidden
admixtures and idolatry, not in the context of a blanket prohibition on
Gentile food.20
At the same time, of course, our mishnah offers a blanket justification
for the prohibitions on Gentile foods. This justification is much stronger
than the individual justifications apparent from the mishnayot in the
collection. It is plausible that the dialogue was introduced to provide
such a justification for the collection as a whole – according to the
dialogue. But while the “theological” reasoning of the dialogue is more
compelling, because it encompasses all the forbidden food-items and
provides for the arbitrariness of the system (things are the way they
are because they are the way they are), it also hangs on a thread, since
it cannot be supported by any previously known system of food laws
(such as kashrut or the prohibition on idolatry). The Talmudim, due
to this exchange, are hard-pressed to find a good reason for the prohibi-
tion of cheese.21 The dialogue therefore offers a justification for the
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20 Naeh, “Love.” This is precisely as Hayes contends (see n. 7 above); but Hayess
opinion is only one opinion that prevailed among the rabbis, and the dialogue presents
a differing opinion. Jordan Rosenblum, Food and Identity in Early Rabbinic Judaism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 83–90, attempts to explain these pro-
hibitions on the ground of the identity of the party preparing the food. This would go
well for milk, but not for “hearted hides” or meat going into the house of an idol.
Additionally, I am not sure that the mere “supervision” of a Jew over a Gentile milking
a goat constitutes a relationship of “chef” and “sous-chef” between them, as Rosen-
blum posits for cheese (ibid.).
21 See y. Avod. Zar. 2:4–5, 41c for a multitude of reasons for this prohibition, none of
which is especially convincing. The Bavli distinguished between cheese from Bythinia/
beit oniake (see n.9 above) and “regular” Gentile cheese, and discussed the latter on 35b.
For subsequent controversies over Gentile food items, see Sefer hiluf minhagin bein
benei eretz israel uvein benei bavel, ed. B.M. Levine (Jerusalem, 1942) and Hahilukim
shebein anshe mizrah uvenei eretz israel, ed. M. Margulies (Jerusalem, 1938) §§10 (cheese
and milk), 30 (bread), 53 (cooked food). (These are two editions of the same work,
which enumerates a number of differences in ritual and practice between Babylonian
and Palestinian Jews. Ed. Levine is a collection of citations, while ed. Margulies is a
critical edition from manuscript material.) Pirqoi ben Bavoi chastised Palestinian Jews
for their leniency over these matters. See Neal (Nahman) Danzig, “Between Palestine
and Babylon: New Fragments of the Work Pirkoi ben Bavoi” (Heb.), Shalem 8 (2008)
1–32 and Robert (Yerahmiel) Brody, Pirkoi ben Bavoi and the History of the Inter-Jewish
Polemic (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2003). See also the opinion of R. Jacob Tam
(12th c.) in Teshuvot ufesakim, ed. Kupfer, 32 (“For myself, I permit the cheese of
Gentiles”) and the various opinions presented in Tosafot, Avod. Zar. 35a, s. v. “hada.”
prohibition on all Gentile foods, but it does not fit with the thrust of the
collection of mishnayot that it is meant to justify.
B. Mishnah Avodah Zarah 3:4
The second dialogue in the tractate recounts an exchange set in a bath-
house in Akko.22
Paraklos b. Plaslos asked Rabban Gamaliel in Akko, as23 he was bathing
in the bath of Aphrodite.
He said, “It is written in your Torah, none of the herem24 shall cling to
your hands (Deut 13:18); why then do you bathe in the bath of Aphrodite?”
He said, “Answers are not given in the bath.”
And when he left, he told him, “I did not come into her precinct (gevu-
lah), she came into my precinct. They do not say, let us make a bath a
decoration for Aphrodite, but Aphrodite is made a decoration for the
bath. Another thing: were they to give you much money, would you come
to your idol naked and impure of seminal emission, and urinate in front of
her? This one stands on the sewer, and all the people urinate in front of her.
It says their gods (Deut 12:2). That which is treated like a god is forbidden,
and that which is not treated like a god is permitted.”25
Paraklos26 and R. Gamaliel were bathing together in Aphrodites bath
in Akko. The former, deridingly nicknamed “ben Plaslos” or “bean-
214 Amit Gvaryahu JSQ 19
22 This dialogue has been the subject of extensive discussion and debate. See, most
recently, Ishay Rosen-Zvi, “Shall You Destroy All the High Places?” (Heb.), Reshit 1
(2009) 91–116. See also Azzan Yadin, “Rabban Gamaliel, Aphrodites Bath, and the
Question of Pagan Monotheism,” JQR 96 (2006) 149–179; Emanuel Friedheim, “The
Story of Rabban Gamaliel in the Bath of Aphrodite in Acre: A Study of Palestinian
Realia” (Heb.), Kathedra 105 (2003) 7–32; Yaron Zvi Eliav, “The Roman Bath as a
Jewish Institution: Another Look at the Encounter Between Judaism and the Greco-
Roman Culture,” JSJ 31 (2000) 416–454; Seth Schwartz, “Gamaliel in Aphrodites
Bath: Palestinian Judaism and Urban Culture in the Third and Fourth Centuries,” in
The Talmud Yerushalmi and Graeco-Roman Culture 1, ed. P. Schfer (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 1998) 203–217; and Moshe Halbertal, “Coexisting with the Enemy: Jews and
Pagans in the Mishnah,” in Tolerance and Intolerance in Early Judaism and Christianity,
ed. G. Stanton and G. Stroumsa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
23 “As,” meaning both “while” and “since,” to reflect the ambiguity of the Hebrew.
24 Herem is a term pregnant with many strata of meaning and context, and there-
fore I leave it untranslated. See J. A. Naudé, h
˙
erem, New International Dictionary of Old
Testament Theology and Exegesis (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1997) 2.276–277.
See also William Horbury, “Extirpation and Excommunication,” VT 35 (1985) 13–38.
25 m. Avod. Zar. 3:4.
26 This is the vocalization in MS Kaufman; MS Parma 3173 (De Rossi 138) is not
vocalized here, but the spelling there reflects a similar vocalization. See Rosenthal, AZ,
edition ad loc. for variants.
man,”27 asks R. Gamaliel why he is deriving benefit from the bath of
Aphrodite. Your Torah, says Paraklos, explicitly forbids benefit derived
from idols, for the verse says “and none of the condemned things shall
cling to your hand” (Deut 13:18).28 Four alternative answers are pro-
vided in the name of R. Gamaliel:
1. Answers are not given in/on the bath.
2. I did not come into her limits.
3. They do not say, “Let us make a bath for Aphrodite.”
4. The idol is permitted, for this is not how a god is treated.
First, note that the answers shift from the bath to the goddess. The
answer “we do not give answers in/on the bath” can be interpreted as
“perhaps we should not be having this discussion at all.”29 Then R.
Gamaliel addresses the area around the goddess, her precinct, templum
or perhaps temenos.30 The following answer focuses on the building at
the center of the sacred precinct (temple/bath). The final answer, the
linchpin of the entire dialogue, focuses on the idol itself and the mode
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27 Yadin, “Question,” prefers the reading Plosfos, attested in the Babylonian wit-
nesses of the Mishnah, because there is no “Plaslos” in the Greek onomasticon (per
Avraham [Adi] Wasserstein, “Rabban Gamaliel and Proclus of Naucratis” (Heb.), Zion
45 [1980] 257–267). Dov Zlotnick, “Proklos ben Plaslos” (Heb.), in Saul Lieberman
Memorial Volume, ed. S. Friedman et al. (Jerusalem and New York: Jewish Theological
Seminary, 1993) 49–52, points out that plaslos is the Yellow Lupin (Lupinus Luteus); see
m. Kil. 1:3 and t. Kil. 1:2, as well as Yehuda Feliks, Plants and Animals of the Mishnah
(Heb.; Jerusalem: Institute for Mishnah Research, 1985) 124.
28 Rosen-Zvi, “High Places,” points out that Paraklos is using the rabbinic inter-
pretation of Deut 13:18 in his question, which understands the verse as referring to a
prohibition on idols and benefit derived from them, not an obligation to destroy them,
as is inherent in the term herem. This, explains Rosen-Zvi, frames the discussion from
its very inception in terms of prohibition. According to the verse he quotes, Paraklos
could well have asked why Gamaliel does not ransack the bathhouse, but he does not,
and this choice is significant.
29 As the anonymous reader of this article suggested, this may be read as an antici-
pation of R. Gamaliels final response: bathhouses are not suitable arenas for religious
engagement – neither R. Gamaliels religion, nor that of his interlocutor (see also
below, n 34.)
30 On temenos and its significance in Hellenistic worship, see Walter Burkert, “The
Meaning and Function of the Temple in Classical Greece,” in Temple in Society,
ed.M. V. Fox (Missoula: Eisenbrauns, 1988) 29–48, and Christine Survinou-Inwood,
“Early Sanctuaries, the Eighth Century and Ritual Space: Fragments of Discourse,” in
Greek Sanctuaries: New Approaches, ed. N. Marinatos and R. Hgg (London: Rout-
ledge, 1993) 1–17, esp. 4 ff. Eliav, “Bath,” claims that the point of the answer is not “she
came into my limits,” but rather the beginning “I did not come into her limits,” claim-
ing in essence that Gamaliel did not enter the sacred precinct. But then what does one
do with the end of the sentence? It seems that the answers are mere polemic, and “I was
here first,” though not sound halakhic reasoning, is a passably good retort. See also
Yadin, “Question,” 170.
in which it is treated by its visitors. Second, we see that none of these
replies is satisfactory at all. The first one is not even much of an answer
– it is an avoidance of the question. The other three answers make no
sense: although the ritual status of the bath in Roman religion is a point
of contention,31 this bath was made for Aphrodite, and R. Gamaliel did
indeed come into her precinct: it was, after all, “the bath of Aphrodite.”
As the Bavli already points out, if the bath was made for Aphrodite,
then that is how the god is worshipped.32 Indeed, the Talmudim do
not hold these answers in high regard.33
The Tosefta contains perhaps the first attempt to bring R. Gamaliels
homily in line with the rest of the Mishnah, by using it as a justification
for the laws of nullification.
And could all idols nullified by Gentiles be forbidden? Scripture says, the
statues of their gods (Deut 12:3) – those that are treated like God are for-
bidden, and those which are not treated like God are permitted. And could
216 Amit Gvaryahu JSQ 19
31 See Friedheim, “Bath,” and Yaron Zvi Eliav, “On Avodah Zarah in the Roman
Bath – Two Notes” (Heb.), Kathedra 110 (2003) 173–180, esp. n. 10. Eliavs contention
on p. 180 that the bath was “public” is conjectural. See also Shelley Hales, “Aphrodite
and Dionysus: Greek Role Models for Roman Homes?” in Role Models in the Roman
World: Identity and Assimilation, ed. S. Bell and I. L. Hansen (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 2008) 235–255. Compare this to Halbertals contention (“Coexist-
ing,” p. 166) that R. Gamaliel is attempting to describe the bath as neutral space, so as
not to allow idolatry to claim what is in his mind rightfully his, as part of the public
sphere (note also that if the first reply of R. Gamaliel does indeed prefigure the last
reply, then he is marking the bath as off-limits to all religions, making it completely
neutral). Eliav, ibid., points to flaws in Halbertals “neutrality doctrine,” as does Beth
Berkowitz, “The Limits of Their Laws: Ancient Rabbinic Controversies about Jewish-
ness (and Non-Jewishness),” JQR 99 (2009) 121–157. Berkowitz points out that it was
the school of R. Akiva that attempted to create neutral spaces, while the school of R.
Ishmael was more suspicious of this tendency. Even the school of R. Akiva, however,
would be hard pressed to call the bath of Aphrodite a “neutral space.” Berkowitz also
makes important observations on the problems inherent in assuming the rabbis – or
any other ancient intellectual group – even had a concept of “neutrality” in their world;
see pp. 155–157.
32 As stated by m. San. 7:6, and perhaps significantly nowhere in m. Avod. Zar.: “He
who defecates (poer <atzmo) before Baal Peor [is liable], for such is his worship. He who
throws a stone at Mercurius [is liable], for such is his worship.” Mercury-Hermes was
indeed worshipped by stone-throwing (as suggested by the very name Hermes, meaning
“of the heap [of stones]”); see W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greeks and Their Gods (Boston:
Beacon, 1954) 88 and n. 5. Baal Peor, however, had nothing to do with the sort of
worship attributed to him (see K. Spronk, “Baal of Peor,” in Dictionary of Deities
and Demons in the Bible, ed. K. van der Toorn et al. [Leiden: Brill, 1995] 147), and
the attribution seems to be a folk etymology for an obscure name of an unknown
god. See also the cycle of tales regarding Baal Peor in Sifre Num 131.
33 y. Avod. Zar. 3:4, 42d calls the answer “distracting” (hefleg); b. Avod. Zar. 44b
calls it “stolen” (genuvah); the Bavli picks the dialogue apart from every possible direc-
tion.
the idol of Israel nullified by a Gentile be permitted? Scripture says, the
statues of their gods – only their gods, those which are treated like God
are prohibited and those which are not treated like God are permitted,
and those of Israel, whether or not they are treated like God, are prohib-
ited.34
The Tosefta attempts to use R. Gamaliels homily in order to ground the
laws of nullification in scripture.35 However, R. Gamaliels homily in the
Mishnah is not a justification for these laws at all! Nullification of an
idol must entail at least the semblance of a physical action directed at an
idol, not just bathing by it – which is an accepted use of an idol, as we
have shown.
Even if R. Gamaliel is trying to ignore these realities and posit a law
that states that if idols are to create forbidden spaces around themselves
they must be treated “like gods” (i. e., in a manner that R. Gamaliel
would deem fit for a god), this law is contradicted by other parts of
the Mishnah. The Bavli is quick to point out that m. Avod. Zar. 4:3 rules
that an idol with a garden or a bathhouse prohibits benefit from the
garden or bathhouse “for profit” (betovah), while benefit “not for
profit” (shelo betovah) is permitted. The term betovah implies a price
paid, in money, goods, services or simply a returned favor, for the use
of the bath. This is a clear criterion for deciding when one may or may
not use a bathhouse belonging to an idol, regardless of the unseemly
actions that go on there.
Additionally, m. Avod. Zar. 1:7 decrees that bathhouses may be built
with Gentiles until the dome that holds the statue is erected, implying
that the statue in the dome is indeed an idol, whose presence in the
dome makes it forbidden, contrary to R. Gamaliels contention.36
R. Gamaliel makes no mention of either law, and his distinctions are
disregarded by those sources.37
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34 t. Avod. Zar. 6:6. In MS Erfurt, “of Israel” in line 5 is missing but is implied by
the end of the text. MS Erfurt also reads leshum eloah in place of minhag eloah, trans-
lated here “like God.” The meaning is the same for our purposes.
35 On these laws and their supposed basis in scripture (or lack thereof), see Noam
Zohar, “Avodah Zarah and Its Annulment” (Heb.), Sidra 17 (2002) 63–77, esp. 63–66.
See also the discussion of the term and meaning of the laws of annulment below.
36 As noticed by Halbertal, “Coexisting,” 167, this is an additional attempt to dis-
tinguish building and idol, which should not necessarily be distinguished or even
distinguishable from each other.
37 Various distinctions could be made between these mishnayot (for 1:7 more easily
than for 4:3), but they would mostly be artificial, scholastic attempts at resolving the
manifest incongruity between treating the bathhouse in a formalistic manner and tak-
ing it to the realm of the theological.
Moreover, not only are the answers not congruent with the laws
regarding bathhouses in the rest of the tractate, but they are also decid-
edly out of place in their literary context. The collection of mishnayot
regarding images is constructed as an exegesis of Deut 7:25–26.38 Scho-
lars have long noticed that the Mishnah replaced the commandment to
destroy idols with a prohibition on their use.39 This replacement was not
just legislative.40 As can be seen in a comparison of the verses and the
collection of mishnayot beginning “All images” (3:1), it was exegetical as
well:
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38 The phenomenon of midrash hidden in the Mishnah, following verses and
expounding on them, while making no explicit mention of this fact, is quite prevalent
in the Mishnah, and has received no proper scholarly treatment to date (see, e. g.,
Rosen-Zvi, “Protocol,” ch. 4). It is distinct from whole midrashic units woven into
the Mishnah (e. g., San. 2:3), as well as from single verses explicitly quoted in the
Mishnah.
39 This was, in fact, a point of contention among Tannaim. As pointed out by
Rosen-Zvi, “High Places,” the school of R. Ishmael did not accept this change and
continued to hold to the original obligation to destroy the idols literally (taking into
account, of course, pragmatic considerations). The first to discuss this revolution was
Efraim E. Urbach, “The Laws of Idolatry and Archaeological and Historical Reality in
the Second and Third Centuries” (Heb.), in From the World of the Sages, ed. idem
(Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988) 125–178, who explained these rabbinic leniencies as part
of an attempt to adapt to changing economic conditions in the Roman Near East after
the destruction (pp. 134–136 ), as well as a realization that both Jews and Gentiles were
not all that serious about the powers attributed to the gods (p. 155). His position was
problematized by Hayes, Talmuds, 57–63, and Seth Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish
society, 200 B. C. E. to 640 C. E. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 172–177
(their critiques hold true for Rosenblum, “Oil,” as well). Schwartz, however, fails to
provide a compelling explanation for this change, especially in light of the Ishmaelian
position (to which he does not refer), which abrogates the obligation to destroy idols as
a matter of expediency, not ideology. Yair Furstenberg reads this revolution in the
context of Greco-Roman religion, especially civic religion, in the Roman Near East;
see Furstenberg, “Nullification of Idols: The Rabbis Dialogue with Idolatry under the
Roman Empire” (Heb.), Reshit 1 (2009) 117–144. Ishay Rosen-Zvi, “High Places” con-
tends that m. Avod. Zar. 3:3, which rules that vessels found with the shape of the sun,
moon or dragon should be “taken to the Dead Sea,” is an Ishmaelian opinion which
does not abrogate destruction of idols entirely. I do not believe this reading is the only
correct one, and the term “taken to the Dead Sea” is purposely ambiguous. Cf. the
other occurrences of the term in the Tannaitic corpus that all rule about monies
obtained in problematic circumstances (e. g., m. Naz. 4:4, 4:6; m. Avod. Zar. 3:9). The
ruling could be referring to use of the vessels, which is prohibited and thus there is
nothing left to do with them except destroy them. The sages object to R. Joses ruling
that other forms of destruction may be used, since benefit can be derived from that
destruction as well (“it, too, can become fertilizer”), implying that benefit from the
idolatrous vessel and its use are the locus of the prohibition, not its mere existence.
40 The verse is expounded neither in Sifre Deut., nor in the remaining fragments of
Mek. Deut., as it is outside the scope of both works.
Torah Mishnah
(Deut 7:25a) You shall burn the
statues of their gods in fire.
(3:1) All images are prohibited, for they
are worshipped once a year – the words
of R. Meir.
The sages say: None are prohibited un-
less they hold a staff or a bird or a ball.
R. Shimon b. Gamaliel says: Anything
that holds anything [is prohibited].
(3:2) He who finds broken images, they
are permitted. If he finds the shape of
an arm or leg, they are forbidden, for
similar [objects] are worshipped.
(3:3) He who finds vessels with the
shape of the sun or the moon or a
dragon should take them to the Dead
Sea.
R. Shimon b. Gamaliel says: [Images]
on the dignified [vessels] are forbidden;
on the common [vessels] are permitted.
R. Jose says: He can file them and
scatter [the dust] to the wind, or throw
[the vessel] into the sea. They told him:
it, too, can become fertilizer, for it says
and none of the condemned should cling
to your hand (Deut 13:18).
(3:3) [story of R. Gamaliel in the bath]
(Deut 7: 25b)
You shall not covet the silver
and gold on them, and take
them for yourself, lest you
stumble upon it, for it is the
abomination of the Lord your
God.
(3:4) Gentiles who worship mountains
and hills: they are permitted, and what
is on them is forbidden. For it says: You
shall not covet the silver and gold on
them, and take them (Deut 7:25). R.
Jose the Gallielan says […] R. Akiva
says […]
(Deut 7:26a) And you shall not
bring an abomination into your
home and become herem like it.
(3:5) One whose home was adjacent to
the home of an idol, and [the house of
the former] fell, he may not rebuild it.
What should he do? […]
If the wall was jointly his and the idols,
[half is forbidden, and half is per-
mitted].
(Deut 7:26b) You shall entirely
abhor and detest it
Its stones, wooden beams, and rubble
carry the impurity of a crawling thing,
for it says: Entirely abhor them.
The Mishnah expounds the verse carefully: the images of the gods are
forbidden (“burn the statues of their gods in fire,” 3:1–3), while natural
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phenomena are permitted (“do not covet the gold and silver on them,”
3:5).41 “Bring no abomination into your home” is the basis for a discus-
sion on the matter of a person who was unlucky enough to share a
collapsed wall with a temple (3:6).42 “Entirely abhor them” is read as
meaning that idols and idolatry impart impurity like a crawling thing.43
The exchange in m. Avod. Zar. 3:4, specifically R. Gamaliels last answer,
introduces a new criterion that modifies this entire system and makes it
much more lenient. Idols, actual statues of gods, must be treated like
gods in order to be subject to any sort of prohibition – all the more so
vessels with images.44 This criterion is an exegesis of the words “their
gods” in the verse, and R. Gamaliel says so explicitly.45 This exegesis
also breaks the homiletical sequence of the Mishnah and re-reads, out
of place, two words in the phrase it has already read.
These connections to the immediate context are somewhat weakened
by the fact that the story offers a criterion for leniency unheard of in the
entire tractate, and in doing so significantly modifies the laws of idolatry
(in a manner subsequently adopted, in a modified form, by Gamaliels
son, and in another modified form by the Tosefta, Avod. Zar. 6:6, dis-
cussed above).
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41 Since the first part of the verse forbade idols, the part that forbids coveting the
gold and silver on them must be about idols that are not forbidden, i. e., natural phe-
nomena that are worshipped, such as mountains or hills. The mention of mountains
and hills is a reference to Deut 12:2, which is also the subject of the debate between R.
Akiva and R. Jose Haglili, paralleled in Sifre ad loc.
42 This exegesis seems to be an instance of hakkatuv meddaber. For this mode of
exegesis, see Azzan Yadin, Scripture as Logos: Rabbi Ishmael and the Origins of Mid-
rash (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001) 23–24.
43 Shaketz (translated “abhor”) is associated with crawling things and their impur-
ity, using Lev 7:21. Sheketz and sheretz are interchangeable. See BDB, vxy, vwy, 1056,
1054. R. Akivas dictum appears also in m. Shab. 9:1, Mek. Deut. 12:3 and t. Avod. Zar.
5:6. The original context of the dictum is difficult to ascertain, but it seems that it is in
Mishnah Shabbat. See also Noam Zohar, “Rabbi Akiva Said: The Incorporation of a
Foreign Collection in the Redaction of the Mishnah” (Heb.), Tarbiz 70 (2001) 353–
366.
44 This criterion is also mentioned in the previous mishnah by R. Gamaliels son, R.
Shimon b. Gamaliel, but not about idols per se, only about vessels with images that
may or may not have been worshipped. Other criteria mentioned in the mishnah are
also exegeses of the words their gods: “all images are forbidden for they are wor-
shipped” (R. Meir); “none are prohibited unless they hold a staff, or a bird, or a
ball” (the sages; these are symbols of dominion and thus typical of the emperor cult,
as pointed out by Urbach, “Idolatry”). Broken images are prohibited, for they are not
gods, but if they are worshipped they may be gods, etc.
45 Our findings significantly corroborate Yadins contention in “Question,” 167:
“Nor should Rabban Gamaliel be automatically understood as a representative of
the rabbis.” Yadins prosopographical evidence is now supported by internal and
structural findings within the tractate itself.
C. Mishnah Avodah Zarah 4:7
The third dialogue in the tractate is more philosophical in nature, and it
inquires as to Gods role in confronting idolatry. Understanding this
dialogue requires some more background information about the concep-
tual framework of tractate Avodah Zarah and its way of interpreting
and developing biblical law.
In rabbinic parlance, avodah zarah means “idol worship,” rather than
“foreign worship.”46 Worship of idols in the tractate is usually centered
on statues (called tzelem, “image,” or tzurah, “figure”), sometimes asso-
ciated with a temple (bayit shel avodah zarah) or a grove (asherah, avodah
zarah she-haytah lah ginah).47 Nature is not usually an object of wor-
ship.48 When someone finds images of the sun or moon on a vessel,
the vessel is prohibited because of the image, not because of its connec-
tion with a sun or moon cult (i. e., if the vessel had “sun” or “moon”
written on it, it would not be prohibited).
Moreover, as mentioned above, the biblical imperative to destroy idols
has all but disappeared in the Mishnah.49 The verses associated with the
destruction of idols have been reinterpreted to mean that idols and the
objects associated with them are prohibited. This prohibition may be
circumvented by use of a procedure called bitul (“nullification”), in
which a Gentile creates a minor defect in the cultic object, signifying
that it is no longer a god.50 Noam Zohar contends that bitul is an essen-
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46 See Zohar, “Avodah Zarah”: 63–66.
47 As is typical of Greco-Roman gods. See above, n. 32.
48 Indeed, the only instance of nature-worship in the tractate is used as an illustra-
tion for the fact that idolizing nature does not prohibit it (3:5); even that instance is
probably a homily on Deut 12:2 or 7:25. See the discussion above, Section B.
49 See above, n. 15.
50 Bitul is an Aramaism that crept into later strata of biblical Hebrew (Eccl 12:3),
and its basic meaning in both Hebrew and Aramaic is “to be idle.” It is cognate with
the Hebrew roots sh-b-t and n-w->. (See e. g., Targ. Neofiti on Deut 32:26, Ex 5:5 12:15,
Lev 2:3 and 26:6.) In one case, the rabbis differentiated between the two: In the context
of hametz, biblical sh-b-t (in Ex 12:15) was read as an obligation to destroy (see Mek.
RS, ed. Epstein-Melamed, 17: “tashbitu – by means of burning”). Bitul, however, was
read as a mental process, as in m. Pes. 3:7: “If one is on the way to slaughter his paschal
offering […] and remembers that he has hametz in his home, if he is able to return
[home] and burn [the hametz] and return to the mitzvah, he should. And if not, he
should nullify it in his heart (mevatelo belibbo).” This mishnah explicitly juxtaposes
bi<ur (i. e., hashbatah) with bitul: the former is a physical process, the latter mental. It
is not unreasonable that bitul was then transplanted to the arena of Avodah Zarah in
which mental invalidation was required. Notice, for example, that the rabbis opinion
of how to dispose of hametz is echoed by R. Jose in m. Avod. Zar. 3:3, the only mishnah
that details a method for ridding oneself of idols. There are other instances of bitul in
tially psychological procedure and that the Gentile, in breaking a piece
of the idol, essentially forswears the god.51 This forswearing is what
causes the prohibition to cease.52 Yair Furstenburg, however, has
pointed out several striking parallels between bitul and damnatio mem-
oriae, destruction meted out on images of Roman emperors who fell out
of favor with the Senate and the people. Damnatio is a physical action, a
political process played out on the terrain of the images of the
emperor.53 In the same way, mere forswearing has no effect in the Mish-
nah: even defiling the idol with excrement or urine has no power to
affect bitul, still less just talking at it or about it.54 Additionally, Fursten-
burg claims, just as damnatio is the result of a consultation between a
new emperor and the Senate (as a representative of the people), bitul
cannot be enacted by Jews (n. 76), but only by Gentiles, as they are
the ones who are replacing their old gods with the new God.
Against this background, situated at the end of the segment in the
Mishnah that discusses nullification, Gentiles ask the elders in Rome
why God does not effect bitul on all the idols in the world. The dialogue
that ensues is quite curious:
They asked the elders in Rome. “If He does not will idolatry to exist, why
does he not annul it?”
They said: “If they worshipped something the world does not need, he
would have annulled it. But behold, they worship the sun, and the moon,
and the stars. Would he destroy his world on account of the mindless?” They
said: “If so, he can destroy what the world does not need, and keep what the
world needs.” They said: “Then we too strengthen the hands of the worship-
pers of the latter, for they will say, know that they are gods, for they have not
been annulled.”55
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the Mishnah, but they are closer to the original meaning, cognate with hashbatah, and
always appear with actions or rites: see Zohar, “Avodah Zarah,” 70 and n. 24. Zohar
does not connect bitul hametz with the same action as applied to idols and explains the
bitul of idols as “legal nullification,” but this definition is not satisfactory, especially for
his purposes. Zohars claim that idols must be nullified by a mental action that is
tantamount to destruction is better fortified by a connection between bitul hametz
and bitul avodah zarah.
51 Zohar, “Avodah Zarah.”
52 Zohar contends that the Yerushalmis ruling that a Gentile may be compelled to
nullify an idol is “ungrounded in Tannaitic sources”; see his “Avodah Zarah,” 74 n. 40.
53 Furstenberg, “Nullification.”
54 Rabbi (in MS Munich 95, R. Eliezer) holds that selling the idol, however, does
effect bitul – but this is a minority opinion. However, if held, it would mean that Jews
could have unfettered access to the housewares market and buy any and all vessels they
wished to buy, whether with images or without. Cf. m. Avod. Zar. 3:3.
55 m. Avod. Zar. 4:7.
The elders are asked why God does not nullify all the idols in the world;
they reply that if God were to effect bitul on all the foreign worship in
the world, he would destroy it. This is a play on words, and a puzzling
one at that. Bitul has a technical meaning: causing an idol to lose its
prohibited status. But it also has a more simple meaning: to cause some-
thing to cease its action, or cease to exist.56 The inquirers could be ask-
ing about the technical meaning, and this is what the reader/listener
expects, after a discussion of the particulars of nullification. The elders
in the dialogue, however, understand it in the less technical manner and
equate it with “destruction.” Indeed, their consternation at the mere
possibility also reflects a view that the entire world is an object of the
cult, a view not prevalent in the rest of the Mishnah. The rabbis are
retreating to a more biblical picture of the laws of idolatry, in which
nature is the object of the cult, and the law for dealing with it mandates
that it be destroyed. They even translate “nullify” with the biblical term
“destroy” (yeabed), borrowed from Deut 12:2. The exchange in the
dialogue plays on this dual meaning. To paraphrase: In context the
question means “why does God not effect nullification on all the idols
in the world?” But the rabbis understand it as meaning “if God does not
will other worship to exist, why does he not destroy the cults?”
The dialogue itself may not be employing this wordplay at all: it
might be a skilled redactor who took a dialogue that existed in a similar
form elsewhere and wove it into the series of mishnayot that discuss
nullification of idols,57 perhaps to provide a homiletic ending to the
tractate.
The dialogue stands at odds with the surrounding mishnayot, both
regarding the meaning of the term bitul and also in the reality it depicts,
portraying idols as focused on nature worship, not on image worship.
The shadow of doubt the dialogue casts on the entire enterprise of bitul
is quite striking. In the hands of God, bitul means something else
entirely, and the mishnaic bitul is not good enough for God. Indeed,
while the laws of nullification provide an adequate substitute for the
obligation to destroy idols and idolatry, the dialogue says that the only
way to really “solve” the problem of idolatry is to destroy the world, and
a piecemeal solution is not possible. As this is not desirable, idolatry is
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56 See above, n. 17.
57 See parallels in Mek. RI Bahodesh 6 (ed. Horowitz-Rabin, 226) and t. Avod. Zar.
7:7. The ending, however, is not in any of the parallels (“They said: If so, he can destroy
what the world does not need, and keep what the world needs. They said: Then we too
strengthen the hands of the worshippers of the latter, for they will say, Know that they
are Gods, for they have not been annulled”). See Furstenburg, “Nullification.”
portrayed not as a temporary reality, but rather as inherent in the very
existence of the world.58
D. Summary
The three dialogues in Mishnah Avodah Zarah are very much at odds
with their surroundings. They undermine and cast doubts on all the laws
around them. They are placed at strategic focal points inside a collection
of mishnayot – either in their center, as is the case with the first two
dialogues, or at their end, as with the last one. I have argued that these
collections of mishnayot are independent of the dialogues and have an
internal structure of their own. Each one of these dialogues is a “foreign
body” within the collections, added to already formed and shaped col-
lections of mishnayot at a later date, perhaps as part of the redaction
process of “Rabbis Mishnah” itself.
As pointed out at the beginning of this paper, the dialogues share
certain formal traits: they are about justifications, and contain questions
and answers. The reasons given are not good and must be backed up by
additional reasons. There is a narrative twist in each of the stories.59 The
realm of the divine is invoked in each to justify discrepancies between
conception and practice (of Jews, of R. Gamaliel, and of God).
The dialogues are obviously at odds with their immediate context, but
they were not interpolated by mistake: they are in dialogue with the
mishnayot around them. They are formally connected to the mishnayot
that precede and follow them, and engage with the subject matter. They
are not transferred from elsewhere. It is more plausible that they are
there for a reason.
This reason is probably a justification for the laws and the reality
these laws react to, together with a certain concession that these justifi-
cations are neither self-evident nor very convincing. The dialogue about
cheese attempts to explain a law that has no explanation, and in doing
so ends up almost undermining the entire hierarchy of Gentile foods in
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58 This position should be compared and contrasted with the position of the Ish-
maelian Mekhilta to Deuteronomy on Deut 12:2. See Midrash Tannaim ad loc.; Solo-
mon Schechter, “Geniza Fragments,” JQR 16 (1904) 425–452, 776–777; and the new
reading by Menahem Kahana, Geniza Fragments of the Halachic Midrashim (Heb.;
Jerusalem: Magnes, 2005), frags. [12] and [13].
59 These formal traits, and the narrative twist, bring to mind the Greco-Roman
chria; see Harry A. Fischel, “Story and History: Observations on Greco-Roman Rheto-
ric and Pharasaism,” in Essays in Greco-Roman and Related Talmudic Literature,
ed. H. A. Fischel (New York: Ktav, 1977).
the Mishnah. The dialogue about the bathhouse has formal connections
to the mishnayot around it, but undermines the system of prohibitions of
idolatry in the Mishnah and lays out a different criterion, which is later
only partially adopted by other Tannaim.60 The dialogue about the tele-
ological significance of Gods patience towards idols has the potential to
make all the newly-formed laws of nullification of idolatry into a farce,
because in the eyes of God, “nullification” is still simply “destruction.”
All three dialogues, therefore, point out real problems in the rabbinic
laws of idolatry. They try to “solve” these problems by subverting the
question, but in doing so they end up calling attention to discomfort the
rabbis may have felt with their own laws, as well as the strategies they
used in facing this discomfort. The innovations the Mishnah introduced
into the laws of idolatry are far-reaching: a prohibition on use and ben-
efit supplanted the obligation to destroy idols. Nullification of idols was
introduced. The food of the Gentiles, entirely taboo in the Second
Temple period, was subjected to categorization and rationalization
that connected it to other prohibitions more grounded in scripture.
There was a movement towards more leniency in the use of the urban
arena, full of statues and images as it may have been. All of these inno-
vations are apparent from the laws of the Mishnah, not the dialogues.
The reasons for these sea changes are not part of the scope of this paper
and have been debated by scholars for many years, but the rabbinic
reaction to them was apparently not unequivocal. The changes in the
laws of idolatry required good explanations, which the redactors of the
Mishnah did not want to give outright.
However, these dialogues have an additional purpose. As we have
shown, they stand apart from the collections of mishnayot around
them, but they are connected to them by certain traits of form and
content. They are also connected to each other by virtue of their formal
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60 I would add that it knows full well that it is advancing an innovative and proble-
matic claim: it is attributing a question that should be dealt with seriously to a Gentile
with a funny name (“bean man”) and gives four answers that are more rhetorical than
substantive. This is comparable to those matters that are marked by the rabbis as being
the advice of the yetzer; see below, section E, as well as Moshe Weinfeld, “Things
About Which Satan/the Evil yetzer/the Nations of the World Retort,” Atara Lehayyim,
ed. D. Boyarin et al. (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2000) 105–111. This is, however, not a case of
the “true” answer being concealed by the rabbi and then revealed to his students, as
discussed in Jenny Labendz, “Socratic Torah: Non-Jews in Rabbinic Intellectual Cul-
ture” (PhD diss., Jewish Theological Seminary, 2010). In stories such as those read by
Labendz there is always a prooftext waiting to be presented to the students, whereas in
this story it is presented to the interlocutor. Rabban Gamaliel does not appear to be
leading Paraklos on, lying to him, or trying to teach him anything at all. This dialogue
is therefore not an instance of “Socratic Torah.”
traits. Together they form a stylistic device that accompanies the learner
throughout the tractate, bringing forth a message that is not necessarily
the one that comes across from the rest of the tractate, or at least not as
strongly.
The laws in Mishnah Avodah Zarah expend much effort towards two
conflicting ends. The first is setting Jews and Gentiles apart. Jews should
stay away from various items of Gentiles and Gentiles themselves in
certain cases. The second is allowing Jews to traverse the idolatrous
public arena by limiting the scope of what an “idol” is and allowing
for the nullification of the idol. The rabbis (of the school of R. Akiva)
decided that one need not destroy idols as a matter of obligation, but
just keep away from them.61 However, the laws separating Jews from
Gentiles were not only maintained, but cemented and explained in
ways that firmly portray the Gentile as a demonized Other to the
Jew.62 Our dialogues form a sort of “redactorial backbone” for the trac-
tate and radicalize both rabbinic revolutions. On the one hand, they do
away with any need to explain and ground the prohibitions of certain
Gentile foods in previously known laws. They claim a theological origin
for these prohibitions and link abstention from Gentile cheese (or wine
or oil) to the love of God, no less – against the thrust of the collection of
mishnayot about Gentile food. On the other hand, the second dialogue
contracts and explains the laws concerning contact with idolatry to a
point that one would be hard-pressed to actually transgress them with-
out engaging in a formal act of worship as defined by the Mishnah. The
third dialogue explains that the existence of idols is actually a logical
imperative and that God cannot do anything against it, further cement-
ing the new reading of the imperative to destroy idols as a prohibition
against using them, since destruction of individual idols is cosmically
futile. These three dialogues therefore form a secondary layer in the
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61 See Rosen-Zvi, “High Places.”
62 See the restrictions in m. Avod. Zar. 2:1–2 and t. Avod. Zar. 3:1–10. Gentiles are
suspect of murder, bestiality and adultery (2:1–2); even barbers, stable hands and wet-
nurses are suspect of these heinous sins. This has nothing to do with their idolatry; it is
portrayed as a characteristic of the fact that they are not Jewish. The very laws of the
Gentiles are perverted; see Berkowitz, “Limits,” and the texts cited there. Noam Zohar
recently read the tractate completely differently. See Zohar, “Partitions around a Com-
mon Public Space: Gentiles and Their Statues in Mishnah Avodah Zarah” (Heb.),
Reshit 1 (2009) 146–163. He made some exceptional points, especially his method of
reading “tapestries” in the tractate as whole units with literary sensitivity, as well as his
observation that some of the heaviest restrictions in the tractate can be understood as
leniencies compared to previous legislation. However, his reading was heavily influ-
enced by Halbertal, “Coexisting,” and by an apologetic agenda. Additionally, he was
not attentive to issues of higher criticism in the tractate and read it all as one.
tractate, at odds with some of its details but at the same time grounding,
justifying and radicalizing its most basic – and audacious – claims.
Did the redactor(s) understand the import of their work?63 Perhaps,
but this is largely immaterial. The dialogues are clearly not cut of the
same cloth as the rest of the tractate, and the joining of the collections
of mishnayot with the dialogues created the tractate as a whole, as we
know it today.64 This is an example of redactorial work, the kind of
work that wove individual strands of oral traditions into a multi-voiced
tractate.
E. A Concluding Note
The role of aesthetics in the Mishnah has recently taken a central place
in scholarship, as the Mishnah has become a focal point of study not
merely as a collection of traditions or laws, but also as a work with
literary properties. The place of narratives in the Mishnah has been
studied extensively by Moshe Simon-Shoshan, who brought earlier
studies not only to firmer theoretical footings, but to actual fruition,
by realizing the central role of narrative in legal discourse, and in the
Mishnah especially.65 The place of aesthetics and literary organization in
the Mishnah has been highlighted by Avraham Walfish, Noam Zohar
and Menahem Kahana.66 At first glance this reading seems to value the
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63 Cf. Simon-Shoshan, “Halacha,” 213: “It may be that the editors of the Mishnah
were fully aware of the implications of what they were doing. They purposefully for-
mulated laws in a way that would allow maximum flexibility for interpretation and
application by future generations of halachists. They sought to present their own
authority in a nuanced way, warts and all, in order to present the Mishnahs students
with a sophisticated and realistic model for the functioning of rabbinic authority. In
this reading, the Mishnah argues that rabbinic authority stands despite challenges to
centralized authority and the ultimately subjective and ambiguous nature of rabbinic
rulings.”
64 Although I contend that they were inserted into the tractate together, as part of
the redactorial process, this is not necessary for my argument about the stylistic func-
tion of the dialogues. Regardless of the date of the insertion of each dialogue into its
respective host-collection, and the connection between all three dialogues, the impact
they have on the tractate as we have it is unmistakable. We also know that by the time
of the earliest Amoraim, all of these dialogues – unlike the glosses (see above, n. 25) –
were firmly in place.
65 Simon-Shoshan, “Halacha”; for earlier studies see idem, 2–7, and also Yonah
Frankel, “Aggadah in the Mishnah” (Heb.), Mehkerei Talmud 3 (2005) 655–683.
66 Avraham Walfish, “The Method of Literary Redaction in the Mishnah” (Heb.;
PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2001); Noam Zohar, Besod ha-yetzira shel
sifrut hazal (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2007); as well as Zohar, “Partitions,” and Menahem
Kahana, “The Mishna and the Order of Its Tractates” (Heb.), Tarbiz 66 (2007) 29–40.
Mishnah as a whole, shying away from higher criticism, while quietly
acquiescing with the results of critical inquiry into lower criticism. A
similar turn towards lower criticism was initiated by David Rosenthal
and his students.67 But the questions of higher critics that focus on the
creation and development of texts are still relevant. A revamped higher
criticism, combining its sensitivity to stratification and periodization in
texts with literary and aesthetic criteria, as we have done here, is a handy
tool for answering these questions, perhaps with surprising results.
This paper examined three dialogue-stories, and it is important to
note that the use of this format in highlighting the problems the rabbis
had with their own laws of idolatry is not coincidental. As we pointed
out in our analyses, the dialogues make it possible both to voice discon-
tent and to dismiss it; they allow for the articulation of good arguments
in a way that makes them ludicrous. The reader knows to beware of the
argument, while acknowledging it as possible and even plausible. This
perhaps reflects the way Jews are expected to interact with Gentiles.
They will no doubt make arguments, and one should know that the
arguments should be dismissed from the onset.
Ishay Rosen-Zvi, in his recently published Demonic Desires, points
out that arguments attributed to the evil yetzer are often those that point
out real flaws in rabbinic theology and discourse.68 Thus, for example,
the idea that God cannot find the sinners in Sheol – an idea backed by
much biblical precedent – is attributed in m. Avot 4:22 to the yetzer. The
rabbis disagree with this idea but do not want to confront it head-on.
They attribute it to the yetzer to avoid the argument. Similar kinds of
flaws in the halakhic system itself are marked here with dialogues with
or about Gentiles. The redactors of the tractate used the dialogue not to
create a conversation but rather to end it before it began.69
The real dialogue in the tractate, however, is not between the charac-
ters in the dialogue-stories, but rather between the laws and the stories.
The laws are both undermined by the stories and undergirded by them.
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See also the important remarks of Ishay Rosen-Zvi, “Orality, Narrative, Rhetoric: New
Directions in Mishnah Research,” AJS Review 32 (2008) 235–249, and the studies he
surveys in n. 1.
67 See Rosenthals remarks at http://jnul.huji.ac.il/dl/talmud/rosenthal.htm.
68 Demonic Desires: “Yetzer Hara” and the Problem of Evil in Late Antiquity (Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2012) 87–101. The discussion of Sheol is on
pp. 91–93.
69 The monologic qualities of the Bavlis dialogues have recently been described at
length by Barry Wimpfheimer, Narrating the Law: A Poetics of Talmudic Legal Stories
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); see especially the methodologi-
cal introduction on pp. 13–25. More research is required to examine this thesis, as well
as its applicability to other rabbinic works.
They exist in a tension that holds the tractate together. These dialogues
could perhaps also be read as a reflection of the way the rabbis under-
stood their interactions with Others. In fact, these interactions are mere
reflections of the interactions between the rabbis themselves, inside the
study house. Cheese, wine, statues and Gentile interlocutors may per-
haps just be a backdrop for the real drama: the rabbis in conversation
with each other.
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